ABSTRACT. We present a theory of the dynamics of a firm's investment in the presence of imperfect capital markets and optimal long-term contracts. The class of imperfections that we consider involves the incentive problems that accompany external financing. The analysis is sufficiently general to encompass a range of such incentive problems. We derive a number of results regarding firms' investment decisions, growth rates, dividends and survival rates. We show that these results arise largely from the general nature of optimal contractual arrangements, not from any particular model of moral hazard.
Introduction
Incentive problems between borrowers and lenders limit the extent of borrowing and consequently limit firms' investments. These limitations on credit and investment will tighten or relax over time depending on a firm's performance. This paper analyzes these investment dynamics given an optimal long-term contract. Our investment model can be applied to a range of incentive problems -for example, the problem associated with inducing an agent to exert costly unobservable effort or the problem associated with an agent's ability to divert a firm's cash flow to himself.
Our model treats investment as observable and thus directly contractible. So an optimal contract will include a specification of the level of investment conditional on the history † We would like to thank Franklin Allen for helpful comments and discussion. * Stanford, CA 94305. Phone: (650) 736-1082, Email: pdemarzo@stanford.edu. * Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) of observable variables. We show that the optimal contract mitigates incentive problems by specifying additional investment following good firm performance and by specifying disinvestment following bad performance. The intuition is that to reward good performance, the agent is given a higher share of subsequent cash flows. This in turn mitigates any agency problems, improving the productive efficiency of investment. Consequently it is optimal to also provide for additional investment following good performance. The opposite is true following bad performance.
The above intuition is independent of any specific agency model. Thus, after presenting the general analysis of investment, we apply the solution to two settings. In one application, a firm's cash flow is observed only by the agent who runs the firm, and the agent can divert cash flow to himself. In the second application, the case of unobservable and costly agent effort is considered.
There are a number of theoretical analyses of investment based on optimal long-term contractual arrangements. Gertler (1992) , Clementi and Hopenhayn (2000) and Quadrini (2001) analyze models in which the moral hazard problem is one in which the firm's manager privately observes the firm's cash flow and can divert it to himself. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2001) , Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001) and Quintin (2001) study related cash diversion models but assume that the firm's cash flow is publicly observed. Among the objectives of these analyses is to explain some of the facts regarding firms' investment decisions, growth rates, dividends, and survival rates. To this end, each of these analyses presents their own model of a moral hazard problem.
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Our objective is to analyze the investment problem without specifying a particular model of moral hazard. We show that the patterns observed in the data (and many of the results derived in the prior analyses) arise from the general nature of optimal contractual arrangements in the presence of agency problems, not from the particular structure of the agency proble ms that have been specified. Among our results:
• Controlling for investment opportunities, current investment is higher if current cash flows are high. This result matches (much debated) empirical findings regarding the relation between investment and cash flow; see Hubbard (1998) for a discussion of this literature.
• Current investment is increasing in past cash flows and past investment. Thus, investment is positively serially correlated over time.
• Conditional on age, investment rates and survival rates are higher for larger firms.
Conditional on firm size, investment rates and survival rates are lower for older firms.
• The sensitivity of current investment to cash flows is higher for small firms. 1 There are numerous other analyses of optimal multi-period contracting in the presence of agency problems. For example, Allen (1983) , Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , Hart and Moore (1994) and Hart (1995) analyze settings with deterministic but uncollectible cash flows. Diamond (1984) , Green (1987) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , Harris and Raviv (1995) , Hart and Moore (1998) , Gromb (1999) , Wang (1999) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2002) analyze settings with stochastic privately-observed cash flows. The interpretation in these analyses is either that there is no on-going investment or that on-going investment takes an all-or-none form.
For situations in which the agency problem is between inside equity holders and outside debt and equity holders (as in DeMarzo and Fishman (2002) ), we also have the following results:
• The sensitivity of investment to cash flow is higher for firms that are not paying dividends.
• Dividend payouts are less likely for smaller firms. Dividends are paid only if cash flow exceeds a threshold.
• Firms with lower leverage invest more and are more likely to pay dividends.
• Survival rates are higher for firms with higher net worth.
For situations in which the agency problem is between managers and outside security holders (debt holders and equity holders), the above results on dividends are replaced by comparable results on managers' compensation/bonus payments.
These results apply both for the case in which agents can commit to a contract and the case with renegotiation.
Section 2 presents the general model. In Section 3, we characterize the properties of investment under an optimal contract. Section 4 applies the solution two settings involving moral hazard. Section 5 has conclud ing remarks.
The General Setting
We model a setting in which risk neutral investors finance a project operated by a riskneutral agent who is subject to a moral hazard problem. At each date t, the project yields a cash flow Y t for the investors. This cash flow depends on some unobservable agent action z t . At this stage, the nature of the agency problem is quite general: the unobserved action might involve unobserved effort, as in a standard principal-agent problem, or it might involve the diversion of cash flow to the agent, as in costly-state verification and costly-state falsification models.
We assume the agent has limited liability (i.e., consumption is bounded below by zero), and can at any time quit the firm and take an outside option that we normalize to zero. These assumptions generally prevent the implementation of the first best in this setting, so that the agency problem is non-trivial.
At each stage t, the firm makes a growth decision θ t . An expansion of the firm, θ t > 1, requires investment of additional capital, while a contraction of the firm, θ t < 1, implies a liquidation of assets and a return of capital. This growth and investment is also verifiable.
A contract between the investors and agent specifies, as a function of the history of observable variables, the current growth/investment decision θ t , the payments to the agent d t , and investors' contribution to new investment. The basic timeline within each period is illustrated in Figure 1 .
We are interested in solving for an optimal long-term contract in this environment. We will not restrict the contract form, but instead solve for an optimal mechanism given the incentive constraints. The contract can depend on all contractible variables, including possible public randomizations. The contract will govern the investment and growth of the firm, the cash flows to investors, and payments to the agent. The unobservable actions of the agent will be determined by incentive compatibility. Solving for the optimal contract involves dynamic programming. At any stage, a contract provides the agent and the investors with some expected discounted payoffs, which we refer to as their continuation payoffs. For any given continuation payoff for the agent, the optimal contract maximizes the investor's continuation payoff.
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This can be characterized at any point in time by a continuation function. A continuation functio n specifies the best possible continuation payoff of the investors as a function of the continuation payoff to the agent. That is, rather than keep track of the entire history, the behavior of the optimal contract can be written as a function of a state v ariable representing the agent's promised future payoff.
The focus of our model is on the dynamics of investment and growth in the presence of an intra-period agency problem within the firm. Thus, we will assume that outside the agency problem, there is no issue of asymmetric information. That is, at each point in time, the continuation function is known (up to a set of contractible state variables). ba is the continuation function immediately before the date t payments to the agent, and so on. Our 2 Note that the optimal contract need not maximize the agent's payoff holding fixed the payoff of the investors. The reason is that providing the agent with an inefficient outcome can be useful in providing incentives in the moral hazard problem. The same is not true for the investors since they are not subject to moral hazard. 3 This rules out, for example, settings in which the agent knows more than investors about the future cash flows of the firm. Of course, due to the agency problem, the agent may know more about the current cash flows. 
Agency

Contracts and Continuation Values
We begin by formally describing the continuation function as of the end of period t. The main purpose of the first section is to make clear the relationship between contracts and continuation payoffs. Then, we look at the effect of transfers and randomization on the continuation function. The goal of is to derive a number of general properties of the continuation function that must hold regardless of the agency problem.
End-of-Period Continuation Payoffs
Let σ t denote a contract in place at the end of date t. This contract governs all actions of the investors, as well as some of the actions of the agent. However, the future actions z τ , for τ > t, taken by the agent are not contractible and represent the underlying agency problem; these actions are chosen strategically by the agent to maximize his payoff. We denote the agent's strategy regarding these actions by ξ t . The space of feasible contractstrategy pairs (σ t , ξ t ) is represented by Γ t .
Given (σ t , ξ t ) ∈ Γ t , we denote the payoff to the agent by A t (σ t , ξ t ) and the payoff to the investors by B t (σ t , ξ t ). Incentive compatibility requires that the agent's strategy is optimal. That is, the agent's strategy choice ξ t must satisfy
A contract-strategy pair (σ t , ξ t ) that satisfies (1) is called incentive compatible, and we denote the set of incentive compatible pairs by Γ t * .
As stated earlier, we abstract in this model from asymmetric information regarding the future prospects of the firm. Thus, we assume the payoff functions A t , B t and the set of admissible contract-strategy pairs Γ t * are common knowledge on date t. From them, we define the payoff possibility set
This set describes the payoff combinations that can be achieved by operating the project beyond date t. Of course, many of these combinations are inferior. The relevant combinations are on the frontier of this set, and can be described by the continuation function To summarize, any feasible contract will specify, as a function of the history h t up to date t, some future continuation of the contract σ t . The agent's incentive compatible response corresponds to ξ t such that (σ t , ξ t ) ∈ Γ t * . Thus, any feasible contract leads to some continuation payoff pair in the set β t , where the pair that is chosen depends on the history h t . An optimal contract chooses points from the frontier of β t , defined by the continuation function Stochastic Opportunity Set. Above, we have assumed for simplicity that the payoff possibility set is deterministic. This is not necessary; we can allow β t to depend on a public, contractible state variable X t . For example, X t might include information regarding current or future investment opportunities. Or the cash flows of the project may be correlated over time. In that case, the payoff possibility set should be written as β t (X t ), with the continuation function () e tt baX . Rather than complicate notation at this stage, we will add this feature to the model in Section 6.1, and show that all of our results continue to apply. a , leading to a Pareto improvement. However, if the investors can commit to the contract, these inefficient outcomes are generally important in an optimal long-term contract as they are a threat that provides strong incentives for the agent.
Renegotiation-Proofness. The continuation function
On the other hand, if the investors cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, we would not expect such inefficient outcomes to survive. That is, the threat of such a low payoff to the agent is no longer credible. We extend our results to the case of renegotiation-proof contracts in Section 6.2.
The Final Period. If t is the final period of the project, then there are no future interactions between the agent and the investors. In this case, we simply define β t = {(0,0)}, and the continuation function (0)0 e t b = and −∞ elsewhere.
Payments and Randomization
Given the continuation function In general, the payoff possibility set β t need not be convex, and thus the continuation function e t b need not be concave. However, by randomizing over elements of Γ t * , it is possible to achieve payoffs in the convex hull of β t and thus "concavify" the continuation function. We allow for such randomization by letting the contract specify a random continuation payoff 
That is, subject to the requirement that the agent's total payoff is d t a , the optimal contract maximizes the total payoff for the investor, () ee tt ba % less the cash payment of d t .
When will the optimal contract provide a dividend d t > 0 to the agent? At this stage, there are two ways to compensate the agent, either by promising a continuation payoff, or by paying him directly through d t . The optimal contract will use whichever form of compensation is least expensive for the investors. Since paying the agent one dollar in cash costs the investor one dollar, cash payments will be used if the slope of the continuation function is below -1; that is, if paying the agent the future would cost more than one dollar. Given concavity of the continuation function, there will be a threshold level of the agent's payoff, 1 t a , such that cash payments will be used above this threshold.
That is,
where,
Given this payment schedule, the agent's expected continuation payoff (prior to randomization) at the end of period t is continuation function. This is the set of payoff possibilities that can be achieved if the agent can commit to a strategy ξ; that is, if we drop the incentive compatibility condition (1). In this case, it is optimal to maximize the cash flows and provide the agent's payoff with a transfer payment. Given the first best value of the project, (,) max(,)(,) ttt fb ttttttt VAB σξ∈Γ ≡σξ+σξ ,
The first-best continuation function is then given by,
Importantly, this first-best continuation function is linear, whereas the continuation function d t b , which embodies future incentive constraints, is generally concave as we shall see. Note also that the total value of the project,
is strictly increasing in a up to the payment boundary 1 t a . These properties are intuitive in the context of a general agency problem. Property 1 states that there is a potential efficiency loss. Property 2 states that the lower we push the agent's payoff, the more onerous the incentive constraints become, reducing investors ability to extract money from the firm. Property 3 states that because raising the agent's payoff relaxes incentive constraints, deferred compensation, rather than immediate cash payments, will be preferred. However, from Property 4, once the agent's payoff is high enough, incentive problems cease to bind and it is optimal to pay the agent directly with cash.
While these properties are natural in the context of an agency model, it is important to emphasize that we derived them here without any specific assumptions on the underlying agency problem.
Investment and Growth
Thus far, we have analyzed the project as though it will run at a fixed scale. In this section we allow for the investment or disinvestments each period to alter the scale of the project. First, we outline our model of investment. Here, our main assumption is that investment leads to growth that is a rescaling of all of the cash flows of the firm. Having developed the model, we then look at the properties of the optimal growth decision.
A Model of Investment
We model investment as a decision to expand or contract the firm each period. In particular, let φ t denote the size or scale of the project on date t. We assume that rescaling the project rescales all of the cash flows associated with the project (including any costs associated with the moral hazard problem). Thus, it expands the original payoff possibility set β t proportionally, so that the new payoff possibility set is given by φ t β t .
That is, we can interpret β t as the payoff possibilities per unit size of the project.
The scale φ t of the project is determined as follows. At the start of period t, there is an initial scale, denoted φ t− of the project. This is the scale of the project absent any additional investment. In period t an investment decision is made regarding the project's growth θ t . As a result, the new project scale is given by φ t = φ t− θ t .
Thus, θ t -1 can be interpreted as the growth rate of the firm, with θ t > 1 corresponding to expansion and θ t < 1 corresponding to contraction.
This growth requires a total investment in period t of ˆ() ttt c − θφ, where again we interpret ˆ() tt c θ as the cost per unit size of the firm. We assume (without loss of generality) that ˆ(1)0 t c = , so that retaining the project's current scale does not require additional investment.
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We do not assume the cost function ˆt c is linear, so this formulation does not assume constant returns to scale. Indeed, in many applications, ˆt c may not be convex, nor even continuous -some resources may not be perfectly divisible. If we allow for stochastic scale changes, however, it is natural to define the implied cost function c t as the "convex hull" of ˆt c as follows
That is, c t (θ) is the lowest cost of achieving an expected scale of θ. By construction, c t is convex, and so exhibits an increasing marginal cost of expansion.
6 Essentially, this normalization defines the notion of scale. That is, a scale of the project is constant absent any investment. This does not rule out depreciation, for example, since it could be that the cash flows of the project at a constant scale decline over time (we do not assume stationarity) so that investment would be required to maintain a constant level of expected cash flows. Running the project at any scale implies that some discrete set of assets mus t be employed. Second, c′ s (1) can be interpreted as the marginal cost of expanding (or contracting) the project at its current scale. There is no requirement that c s be differentiable at 1, so the marginal cost of expansion may differ from the marginal liquidation proceeds associated with contraction. In order to avoid infinite scale choices, we make the weak assumption that ( ) 
We now show that rather than considering stochastic scale choices explicitly, we can simplify the problem by using the convexified cost function c t :
LEMMA 1. Let c t be defined by (7). Then
where we define (/) We can interpret (9) as follows. By choosing expected scale θ, investors must pay the expected cost c t (θ), per unit size. However, investors benefit in two ways from this investment. First, their payoffs grow directly by θ. Second, they can reduce the per-unit compensation paid to the agent by the factor θ, with changing the agent's overall payoff.
Note also that the case θ t = 0 can be interpreted as a liquidation of the project. Choosing θ t = 0 implies that φ τ = 0 for all τ ≥ t. In this case the liquidation proceeds are −c t (0) per unit. Sharing some amount a of these liquidation proceeds with the agent leaves investors with −c t (0) − a.
The solution θ to (9) need not be unique. In fact, the set of optimal θ will be an interva l if both economic consequence, but makes statements regarding formal properties of the solution more cumbersome. To avoid this, we arbitrarily (and without loss of generality) assume that if the set of optimal θ is non-degenerate, the firm chooses the smallest optimal scale. That is, we define
We analyze the properties of the optimal growth decision next.
Optimal Growth
Before analyzing properties of θ t , we first characterize the optimal scale decision in a first-best setting. a . This is due to the convexity of the investment cost function. Since the marginal cost of investment is increasing, it is optimal to increase the agent's payoff both by increasing the scale of the project, and also by increasing the per-unit payoff.
Next, Figure 5 shows the continuation function comes from the fact that the cost function is convex and thus returns are diminishing. Third, while the agent's per-unit payoff post-investment is bounded below by 0 t a , the pre-investment payoff can be as low as zero. This is because we can always reduce the agent's rents by shrinking the size of the project. In the limit, zero rents to the agent are guaranteed by liquidating the project.
Cash Payments vs. Growth. Recall from Section 3 that if the agent's post-investment payoff is high enough, he may be rewarded with a cash payment. In this section we have shown that investment and growth are used to provide the agent with a high preinvestment payoff. Our next result establishes that there is a strict priority over these reward systems: if cash payments to the agent are observed, then growth must already be maximal. To show this, first define the maximal growth rate, In this case, the growth that solves (9) is equivalent to the solution to min() t c θ θ ; that is, we choose the growth level that maximizes the liquidation payoff. In most settings, c t is increasing, so that θ t = 0. In that case, () (0) III tttt baac =−− , and the investors collect the liquidation proceeds, net of any payments to the agent.
The Agency Stage
In this section we describe a generic agency problem between the agent and the investors in period t. We suppose that prior to the investment decision in period t, the agent can take actions that affect the cash flows of the firm. Thus, an optimal contract must provide the appropriate incentives for the agent regarding that action choice.
A General Model of Agency
Rather than specify a specific agency problem (moral hazard, costly state verification, etc.), we first write a general specification from which we can make a number of important observations. During the agency stage, the agent makes an action choice z t . This action choice affects the cash flows Y t received by the investors in period t, as well as a direct payoff W t to the agent. In addition, z t also affects the outcome of a set of contractual variables Q t . Generally, Q t will include the cash flow Y t , but may include other information, such as the results of audits, etc.
Based on the history up to the date t agency problem, the agent will be due some continuation payoff y t a . The agent will receive this reward through the direct utility W t received during the agency stage of period t, together with a promised continuation payoff () a . This is a generalization of the standard participation constraint to this dynamic programming context; as we remarked above, y t a is the continuation utility promised to the agent given the current history. Finally, the feasibility constraint for the agent's payoff (AF) restricts the continuation utility to the feasible range.
The solution to (10) describes the continuation payoffs available to the agent and the investors prior to the date t agency problem, and is summarized by the continuation function y t b . It is important to recognize that the agency problem (10) is a standard, static agency problem. The dynamics of investment and growth under the optimal dynamic contract will follow from standard comparative statics results of this one-period problem. For example, in many standard static agency models, the agent's reward is increasing in the principal's cash flows, Y t . This yields, as an immediate implication, the following main result below: THEOREM I. Suppose the optimal static reward function, I t a , is increasing in the cash flows Y t . Then 1. Expected growth at date t, θ t , is increasing in the date t cash flow, Y t , 2. The agent receives a cash payment only if the cash flow exceeds a threshold.
The Final Period.
As we have discussed thus far, in the final period ()(0)
. In this case, (10) is identical to a standard static one period model: the principal receives the project cash flows plus liquidation proceeds, less any transfers to the agent. In the multi-period setting, the problem changes since 1
it is cheaper to compensate the agent using future rewards rather than an immediate transfer. Because incentive provision becomes cheaper, the agency problem can be mitigated with a longer horizon.
Intertemporal Linkage
Once we have solved (10), we can then use resulting continuation function 
Given e s b , we can begin the analysis again starting from equation (3). Thus, this completes our specification of the dynamic programming problem for the optimal contract design, which we summarize below:
PROPOSITION 4. The system of equations, (3), (7), (9), (10) and (11), recursively defines the payoff frontier available from an optimal contract, starting from the boundary condition (0)0
where T is the life of the project.
Proposition 4 allows us to calculate the optimal continuation function recursively. The dynamics of the optimal contract, on the other hand, are determined by the evolution of the state variable a representing the promised continuation payoff for the agent at any stage in the contract. The dynamics of this state variable, and their consequences for the decision variables of the contract, are summarized below:
We have described explicitly the solution to all stages of these dynamics, with the exception of () I tt aQ which depends upon the specifics of the agency problem.
With the possible exception of () I tt aQ all steps of the dynamics of the agent's continuation payoff are monotonic. That is, the agent's continuation payoff at any stage is weakly increasing in the agent's continuation payoff at an earlier stage. If this is also true for the agency stage of the contract, then this monotonicity will be preserved across periods, and have consequences for the dynamics of growth. For example, suppose growth is high in period s. Because s θ and I s a are positively correlated, this implies that the agent's promised reward at the end of period s is also high, which implies that the promise y t a to be satisfied in period t will also be high. If the agent's optimal static reward I t a is increasing in the reservation utility y t a , then growth in period t will also be high. This intuition is formalized in our second main result below:
THEOREM II. Suppose the optimal static reward function, where R 0 is the reservation utility of the agent.
Model Extensions
Stochastic Investment Opportunities
In this section we consider the case in which the future prospects of the firm are influenced by a verifiable Markov state variable X t . We assume the state variable X t summarizes all of the available information on date t regarding the future characteristics of the project. For example, it might contain information about the investment cost function. It may also contain information regarding the parameters of next period's agency problem, such as the distribution of the project's cash flows. And, of course, it contains information relevant to the distribution of X τ , for τ > t.
For simplicity, suppose X t is revealed at the start of the investment stage. (Any other timing can be handled similarly). Since X t influences the future payoff possibilities, the continuation function is now conditional on X t . That is, we let (|) 
The following result demonstrates that we can take the post-information payoff, () 
As a result, all of the key properties of the continuation function and the contract dynamics are preserved through the information arrival stage, and our earlier results continue to hold.
Renegotiation-Proofness
What about renegotiation of the contract on date t? Note from Figure 5 that for a < r t a , the payoff pair (,()) I t aba is Pareto inferior to other feasible outcomes. If the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate costlessly at this stage, then they will both agree to some superior outcome. Thus, allowing the parties to renegotiate restricts the payoffs that may occur to points on the frontier with a ≥ r t a . According to the renegotiation principle (see Hart and Tirole (1988) ), the optimal renegotiation-proof contract (i.e., the optimal contract once we allow for renegotiation) is characterized by history contingent payoffs that remain on the efficient frontier of the payoff possibility set. We summarize this discussion with the following:
PROPOSITION 6. An optimal renegotiation-proof contract entails a pre-investment continuation payoff for the agent a ≥ r t a , where
Moreover, outside of the agency stage, this is the only requirement imposed by renegotiation-proofness.
In particular, from PROPOSITION 6, in the agency stage the feasibility constraint should be replaced by, b . However, aside from these changes, the underlying dynamics of the optimal contract are unaltered, and our main conclusions continue to apply.
Infinite Horizon
We have developed our model in a finite horizon setting. This was for simplicity; it allows us to use backward induction to solve for the optimal contract recursively. All of our analysis can be extended to the infinite horizon case, as we briefly describe here.
TBA
Applications to Specific Agency Models
Privately-Observed Cash Flows
Consider a model in which the agent privately observes the business cash flows and the contract must induce the agent to share the cash flow with the investor. Here we follow DeMarzo and Fishman (2002) We refer to the initial investment as having a scale of 1, that is, φ 0 = 1. At date t > 0, the prevailing scale is φ t− and the cash flow is φ t− Y t , where Y t is a random variable. Assume that {Y t } are jointly independent and that the lower bound on the support of Y t is 0. The agent privately observes the realization of the cash flow. This is the source of the agency problem. The agent can underreport the realization of Y t and consume the underreported cash. Specifically, given cash flows Y t , the agent can report ŷ and consume ()
The constant λ ≤ 1, and is strictly less than 1 if the agent cannot consume the cash directly but instead consumes inefficient perks.
We solve this as a mechanism design problem. After receiving the date t cash flow, the agent reports the cash flow and pays it to the i nvestors. Then the investor makes the necessary investment to adjust the scale, and potentially makes payment to the agent. A contract specifies the new scale choice and the investor's payment to the agent as a function of the history of reported cash flows and the history of prior investment decisions. At the end of each date, the agent chooses how much to consume out of his cash balance -the remainder is saved, earning the continuously compounded return ρ ≤ r. As with the true cash flows, the agent's consumption-saving decision is hidden from the investors.
Since the agent's savings rate ρ ≤ r, saving by the agent is not necessary for efficiency.
8
Thus, we will characterize the optimal contract under the assumption that the agent consumes all of his cash at each date, saving nothing. Then we will show that with this contract, the agent indeed has no incentive to save. Thus the assumption of no saving by the agent is without loss of generality.
Using the standard revelation principle, we can restrict attention to mechanisms in which the agent truthfully reports the cash flows. By Proposition 1 of DF, this is equivalent to having the agent "report" the cash flows by paying Y t directly to the investors on date t, and then allowing the investors to give some of it back to the agent according to the optimal contract. Thus, we look for a mechanism without messages and such that paying Y t to the investors is incentive compatible.
Given these simplifying results, we can consider a contract that specifies a date t payment from the investors to the agent d t (which the agent will consume), and a date t investment decision θ t , both as a function of the history of payments from the agent to the investor (Y s ) s£t , and the history of prior investment decisions (θ s ) s<t . Given this contract, at each date t, the agent receives the risky cash flow Y t and pays it to the investor. Then the investor pays the agent d t and invests c t (θ t ) to achieve growth of θ t .
This setting fits our model with an appropriate specification of the "static" agency problem. Here, the only contractual variable learned in the agency stage is the reported cash flow. Thus, the agency problem can be written as Note that PROPOSITION 7 implies that the agent's marginal benefit from reporting an extra dollar of cash flow is constant over time. This implies that there will be no incentive for the agent to engage in hidden private s avings, justifying our initial assumption. Note also that since y t b is concave, so is e s b , and therefore no randomization will be required at the end of each period. Thus, if the investment cost function ˆt c is also convex, no public randomization is necessary for an optimal contract.
Given the optimal static reward policy, I t a , THEOREM I and THEOREM II can now be applied to yield the following immediate results regarding the dynamics of an optimal contract in this setting:
COROLLARY. In the DF model, current investment θ t is increasing in current cash flow Y t and current investment θ t is also increasing in past investment, {θ s } s<t .
THEOREM I also implies that cash payments are made to the agent only if the cash flow exceeds a threshold. In this case, given the linear form of the reward I t a , we can interpret these payments as a dividend. In particular, let D t be the debt per unit size of the firm at the start of date t. Suppose that each period, the firm uses the cash flows of the project to repay the debt, and once the debt is repaid uses any remaining cash to pay a dividend to shareholders. That is, on a per unit size basis,
We can then characterize the optimal contract as follows:
PROPOSITION 8. The optimal contract can be implemented by giving the agent the share λ of the firm's equity, and having the debt of firm evolve according to The preceding result allows us to relate some of our earlier results to the use of dividend payments by the firm:
COROLLARY. In the DF model, dividends are paid only if growth is maximal, and therefore insensitive to cash flows.
…
Privately-Observed, Costly Agent Effort
Here we make two changes to the model in the previous application. First, the business cash flow is publicly observed and is collectible by the investor. Second, the cash flow at date t depends on the agent's date t privately observed effort e t . The agent's cost of effort at date t is k t . Otherwise, the basic environment is the same. The incentive problem here involves inducing the agent to exert effort.
In this application, the agent's consumption-saving decision is of no importance to the optimal contract. Since the cash flow is observable, there is no scope for the agent to save with the intent of influencing future compensation. And since the agent is risk neutral, there is no issue involving the agent mitigating the incentive effects of his contract through saving.
